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In the past decade, Congress has enlisted the federal judiciary to
deal with issues ranging from the appointment of special prosecutors
to the development of standardized sentencing guidelines. Although
the role of federal judges has never been confined strictly to the adju-
dication of cases, "Congress and the executive branch have shown an
extraordinary tendency in recent years to entrust numerous thorny
problems to the members of their sister branch of government, the
Federal Judiciary."' Thus, in 1994, when speculation about the effects
of the proposed World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement elic-
ited sovereignty concerns from Congress, it was not surprising that
Congress looked to federal judges for assistance.
In November 1995, former Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) intro-
duced Senate Bill 1438 (S. 1438).2 The bill calls for a five-member
panel, comprised of active federal circuit judges, to review all WTO
dispute resolution decisions adverse to the United States' economic
interests. 3 The proposed "WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commis-
sion" would examine all decisions for both "substantive and proce-
* J.D., 1996; B.A., University of Michigan, 1991. The author wishes to thank his
parents for everything.
1. Ira Bloom & Jane A. Restani, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First
Century: The Quick Solution to Complex Problems, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1668, 1668
(1995). Professor Bloom is a Political Science Professor at Lehman College of The City
University of New York, and Judge Restani sits on the Court of International Trade.
2. S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill is entitled the "WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Review Commission Act." Dole originally submitted the proposal in an earlier
bill, S. 16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). However, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-wVa.)
blocked consideration, criticizing Senator Dole for trying to bring the bill to the floor for a
vote by unanimous consent on the day before the August recess was to begin. See Gary G.
Yerkey, Sen. Dole Places WTO Legislation on Senate Calendar for This Session, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), at 2049 (Dec. 13, 1995). On November 30, 1995, Senator Dole proposed S.




dural fairness, and.., report to Congress regarding the effects of the
decisions on the rights of the United States."'4 This proposal raises
both constitutional separation of powers issues and broad policy
concerns.5
Recently, Congress has utilized extrajudicial bodies to address a
number of domestic issues. Legal challenges have enabled courts to
analyze the concerns regarding extrajudicial service by federal judges.
The Supreme Court has examined two recent, notable examples: the
creation of a Special Division composed of federal judges to appoint
and terminate independent counsel and the appointment of federal
judges to sit on the United States Sentencing Commission.
In Morrison v. Olson,6 the Court upheld Congress' creation of a
Special Division composed of federal judges. Congress empowered
the Special Division to appoint and terminate independent counsel
under the Ethics in Government Act.7 The Supreme Court found no
violation of the Appointments Clause, the provisions of Article III, or
the separation of powers doctrine.8 Only Justice Scalia dissented.
Less than a year later the Court decided Mistretta v. United
States.9 By an 8-1 margin the Court affirmed another congressional
creation, the United States Sentencing Commission. 10 Membership
on the eight-person Commission includes three federal judges." The
body promulgates binding sentencing guidelines which establish a
range of determinate sentences for all federal offenses. 12 The Court
held that Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power to the
Commission, nor violated separation of powers principles. 13 Justice
Scalia was again the lone dissenter.
Perhaps emboldened by Supreme Court approval of its extrajudi-
cial use of federal judges,14 Congress has turned to international trade
4. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1673.
5. In April 1995, a similar version of the Senate bill, also titled the "WTO Dispute
Settlement Review Commission Act," was introduced in the United States House of Rep-
resentatives and is presently before the House Ways and Means Committee. H.R. 1434,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
6. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
7. Id. at 662-64.
8. Id. at 696-97.
9. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 368.
12. See id. at 365.
13. Id. at 412.
14. See, e.g., World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Commis-
sion Act, 1995: Hearings on S. 16 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 16]. In a dialogue between Senator Charles E.
Grassley (R-Iowa) and Judge Stanley S. Harris, chairman of the Committee on Intercircuit
Assignments of the Judicial Conference, Senator Grassley stated, "I am sure that you are
even more familiar than I am with the Mistretta case, but the Supreme Court there indi-
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issues. As part of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Congress approved the use of federal judges on binational
review panels.' 5 Although the plan has not been implemented, these
bodies are slated to review NAFTA trade disputes.
16
The WTO Commission is the most recent congressional proposal
to make extrajudicial use of federal judges, and although passage of S.
1438 is not assured,' 7 the bill is unlikely to be the last of its kind. One
article stated, "[I]nternational trade has been, and probably will be
into the next century, a prominent area for non-traditional, perhaps
extra-constitutional, use of Article III judges."' 8 For this reason, S.
1438 presents a paradigm with which to assess both the constitutional-
ity and the wisdom of using federal judges in this type of role.
This Note presents an in-depth examination of Senate Bill 1438
and concludes that the WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
is an unwise extension of the role of the federal judiciary. Part I sum-
marizes the composition and duties of the proposed Commission. It
also provides a brief overview of the WTO and the concerns which its
dispute settlement provisions present. Part II examines the long-
standing tradition of extrajudicial service and the Supreme Court's
modern-day acceptance of congressional creations like the Sentencing
Commission and the Special Division. It concludes that the Court
would likely hold that the WTO Commission does not violate the con-
stitutional separation of powers doctrine. Part III discusses the policy
implications of the proposal upon the integrity of the judiciary and
concludes that the judicial branch would be detrimentally affected by
the creation of the Commission.
I. Summary of the WTO and S. 1438
In November 1994, the Clinton Administration launched "an
elaborate White House courtship" of Seitator Dole in an attempt to
win his influential support for the WTO implementation bill pending
cated that federal judges could participate in commissions that do not decide cases or con-
troversies." Id.
15. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 687
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
16. Id.
17. Although S. 1438 has made little progress since its introduction, Senator Dole
continued to press for its passage up to the date of his resignation from Congress. See 142
CONG. REc. S5985 (daily ed. June 10, 1996). Referring to S. 1438 on the eve of his depar-
ture, Senator Dole stated, "I hope we might be able to clear this without amendment today
and send it to the House, so the President will have it on his desk for signature-which he
is perfectly willing to do." Id.
18. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1668.
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in Congress. 19 The WTO's goal is to improve current international
trade regimes in goods and services. 20 The body functions to imple-
ment existing international trade agreements, primarily the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).21 Approval of the Uruguay
Round multinational trade agreement in 1994 committed the United
States to all WTO provisions, including its controversial international
dispute settlement panels.22
These panels would possess "extensive powers to resolve trade
disputes among ... [GATT] signatories. ' '23 While GATT had little
binding effect, under the new provisions the United States can neither
unilaterally block panel decisions nor grandfather laws passed prior to
1947.24 However, the panels cannot alter U.S. law to conform to their
decisions. 25 "Thus, even in those instances where a panel finds the
United States has violated its GATT obligations, specific congres-
sional or presidential action would be required to bring U.S. law into
conformity with the GAT, and the United States would be free to
decline to take such action."'26
Despite the non-binding nature of these provisions, trade activists
unleashed a torrent of complaints regarding the WTO dispute
panels.27 Critics as diverse as Phyllis Schlafiy and Ralph Nader lam-
basted the dispute resolution mechanisms.28 Nader called the panels
"a system of penetrating international governance which grants inter-
national tribunals unprecedented authority over the democratic laws"
19. Bob Davis & David Rogers, Clinton, Dole are Close to Deal Seeking to Assure
Critics of World-Trade Pact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at A26.
20. See Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute
Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 221-27 (1995) (summa-
rizing the WTO dispute resolution provisions).
21. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-0465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter Uruguay Round]. The House approved the act by a 288-146 margin. David E.
Sanger, The Lame Duck Congress; The Vote; House Approves Trade Agreement by a Wide
Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at Al. The Senate vote one day later was 76-24. David
E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs; A Victory for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1994, at Al. President Clinton signed the bill on December 8, 1994. Hobart
Rowan, In Trade, a Fight for the Director's Chair, Regional Rivalry for Helm of the WTO
Strains GATT Accord Sought to Strengthen, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1994, at Fl.
22. Uruguay Round, Pub. L. No. 103-0465, 108 Stat. 4809.
23. Michael L. Whitener, Who's Afraid of the World Trade Organization? How the
WTO Will Settle Disputes, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION LEGAL BACKGROUNDER,
Mar. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legal News Library, ALLNEWS File. GATT is the
predecessor treaty to the WTO Agreement.
24. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1676 n.31.
25. Whitener, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. Davis & Rogers, supra note 19, at A26.
28. David Shribman, GATT. Vilifying the Inscrutable, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1994,
at 3; see also Whitener, supra note 23.
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of the United States.29 Commentator, and then-Republican presiden-
tial candidate, Pat Buchanan proclaimed it the "supreme court of
trade. ' 30 Concern that the WTO would dictate U.S. trade policies,
violating American sovereignty, apparently motivated Senator Dole
to propose S. 1438's "Three Strikes and You're Out" plan.3 1
Comprised of five federal appellate judges,32 the Review Com-
mission would examine all WTO dispute resolution decisions adverse
to the United States.33 The Commission would determine if the WTO
panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the Uru-
guay Round trade agreement. 4 If the Commission determines that
the WTO panel violated either procedural or substantive fairness
under the terms of the Uruguay Round agreement,35 it would issue an
"affirmative determination." 36 After three such determinations in any
five-year period, any member of the House or Senate could introduce
a joint resolution to withdraw approval for U.S. participation in the
WTO.3 7
The Commission would act under two circumstances: (1) auto-
matically, when an adverse report from any WTO dispute panel or
Appellate Body is adopted by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
29. Whitener, supra note 23.
30. Id.
31. See S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Sources speculated that the measure would be
approved easily. However, the smooth passage forecast for this provision did not material-
ize. Despite broad-based support from the private sector, the federal judiciary opposed
the measure, ostensibly on efficiency grounds. Finance Committee Chairman Robert
Packwood (R-Or.) called S. 16 a "good piece of legislation" but allowed it might need fine
tuning to survive a likely constitutional challenge. General Developments, 12 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at D-14 (May 17, 1995). In August 1995, Senator Robert Byrd (D-
WVa.) blocked consideration of S. 16, saying that he needed more time to examine the
legislation before clearing it for floor action. On November 30, 1995, Senator Dole rein-
troduced the bill in nearly identical form as Senate Bill 1438. Id.
32. Commissioners are appointed by the President, in consultation with the majority
and minority leaders of both houses, the chairman and ranking member of the Committee
on Ways and Means in the House, and the chairman and ranking member of the Commit-
tee on Finance in the Senate. S. 1438 § 3(b)(1). Commissioners will serve five year terms,
although the initial terms would be staggered to prevent wholesale replacements every five
years. Id. § 3(c)(1).
33. Id. § 4(a)(1)(A). S. 16 was originally interpreted to require that retired judges
serve on the Commission. Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 2. Overall, the bill's express
aim of calming trade activists' fears did not change. The Findings and Purpose Section
stated: "The American People must receive assurances that United States Sovereignty will
be protected, and United States interests will be advanced, within the global trading system
which the WTO will oversee." S. 16 § 2(a)(2).
34. S. 16 § 4(a)(2)(C).
35. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A)-(D).
36.- Id. § 4(a)(3).
37. See id. § 6(a)(2).
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(DSB) 38 and is the result of proceedings initiated against the United
States by a WTO member;39 or (2) upon the request of the United
States Trade Representative, when the DSB adopts an adverse report
in which the United States is the complainant. 40
In reaching its decision, the Commission may hold public hear-
ings,41 solicit information from federal agencies or departments, 42 and
examine the documents used in the WTO decision.43 The Commis-
sion is entitled to administrative assistance from any agency or depart-
ment designated by the President.44 It must report "affirmative
determinations" to the House Ways and Means Committee, the Sen-
ate Finance Committee, and the Trade Representative within 120 days
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's report.45
The Commission's decisions are not binding upon Congress; in-
stead, they serve an advisory function. In response to a single "affirm-
ative determination," Congress may pass a joint resolution calling
upon the President to modify the subject of that determination.46 Fol-
lowing three such determinations within five years, Congress may pass
a "withdrawal resolution," effectively revoking its approval for U.S.
participation in the WTO.47
This proposal places no real check on Congress because, under
the WTO implementing agreements, the legislature may pass a joint
resolution suspending U.S. membership in the WTO for any reason,
with six months notice. Also, Congress must be advised of the result
of every WTO dispute resolution.48 Thus, the Commission, which is
38. Id. § 4(a)(1)(A)(i).
39. Id. § 4(a)(1)(A)(ii).
40. Id. § 4(a)(1)(B).
41. Id. § 5(a).
42. Id. § 5(b)(2)(B).
43. Id. § 5(b)(3)(A) (including "any information contained in such submissions identi-
fied by the provider of the information as proprietary information or information desig-
nated as confidential by a foreign government").
44. Id. § 5(c)(1) (stating that agencies or departments must provide "administrative
services, funds, facilities, staff, or other support services to the Commission").
45. Id. § 4(b)(1)-(2).
46. Id. § 6(b)(1).
47. Id. § 6(b)(2). S. 1438 does not provide actual authority for withdrawal from the
WTO. Congress actually withdraws its approval under section 101(A) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act. Id. § 6(a)(2). S. 1438 supplies language for a withdrawal resolu-
tion: "That, in light of the 3 affirmative reports submitted to the Congress by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Review Commission during the preceding 5-year period, and the fail-
ure to remedy the problems identified in the reports through negotiations, it is no longer in
the overall national interest of the United States to be a member of the WTO and accord-
ingly, the Congress withdraws its approval." Id. § 6(b)(2). If the President vetoes the joint
resolution, Congress may vote to override the veto within 90 days. Id. § 6(c)(1)(B).
48. Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L
L. & PRAc. 3, 38, 39 (1995). Numerous other built-in safeguards ensure congressional
involvement in all amendments or reinterpretations of WTO agreements. In addition, a
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powerless to compel legislative action, merely assumes an advisory
role. However, its decisions may be influential in prompting Congress
to condemn WTO dispute resolution decisions. The political ramifica-
tions created by Commission decisions could exert enormous pressure
on Congress to act consistently with the judges' decisions. Thus, while
the Commission lacks power to compel action, its political influence
could be substantial.
On January 17, 1996, in its first major ruling, a WTO dispute reso-
lution panel decided "that a key section of the [United States] Clean
Air Act discriminated against foreign oil refiners." 49 In response to
the ruling, the Clinton Administration agreed to "change the way it
applied environmental regulations to imported gasoline." 50 A review
of the WTO's decision could be the Commission's first task under S.
1438's provisions. Numerous other disputes involving the United
States are presently pending before the WTO dispute resolution
panels.5 '
H. Constitutional Separation of Powers Analysis
Although not expressly delineated by the Constitution, the sepa-
ration of powers is an established doctrine. It derives from the textual
division of constitutional power among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches laid out in three separate Articles.52 Commenting
on this doctrine, James Madison wrote that it "d[oes] not mean that
these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
control over the acts of each other," but rather "that where the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which pos-
sess the whole power of another department, the fundamental princi-
ples of a free constitution are subverted.153  Consequently,
constitutional separation of powers does not mandate complete inde-
pendence between the branches. As Justice Blackmun wrote in Mis-
tretta, "[the] greatest security against tyranny-the accumulation of
excessive authority in a single Branch-lies not in the hermetic divi-
systematic accounting of the costs and benefits of the WTO must be delivered to Congress
every five years. Id. at 38.
49. David E. Sanger, Trade Group Orders U.S. to Alter Law for First Time, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1996, at D1.
50. Paul Lewis, Is the U.S. Souring on Free Trade?, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at D1.
51. The United States has 13 complaints pending before the WTO and "is itself the
target of complaints filed by Costa Rica, India and the European Union, among others,
which accuse Washington of failing to play by the rules it champions." Id.; see also Frances
Williams, WTO Completes Legal Framework-The Body Providing Teeth to the Complaints
Procedure, FIN. Timns, Nov. 29, 1995, at 5 (listing currently pending disputes).
52. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928).
53. Tim FEDERALIST No. 47, at 375 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
sion among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked
and balanced power within each Branch."'
54
Although the Constitution bars members of Congress from hold-
ing other government positions or offices, 55 no parallel prohibition ex-
ists for federal judges. A long history of extrajudicial service by
federal judges illustrates that no "hermetic division" has ever been
placed on the judiciary. This established tradition provides a guide for
a constitutional analysis of S. 1438.
A. Historical Precedent for S. 1438
In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Judge
Stanley Harris stated, "We are not aware of any law which served as
precedent for the appointment process found in [S. 1438] and there-
fore, these appear to be questions of first impression. ' 56 While S.
1438 does elicit unique constitutional concerns, the extrajudicial use of
federal judges in either domestic or international disputes is not an
original proposition. Judges have assumed these roles since Article III
authorized Congress to establish the judiciary.
The general acceptance of these roles as a legitimate judicial
function stems, at least in part, from Great Britain's extrajudicial use
of judges and the continuation of this practice in the American
colonies.57
Framers at the Constitutional Convention debated the wisdom of
extrajudicial service. Delegates unsuccessfully advanced two meas-
ures prohibiting all extrajudicial service by federal judges.58 Con-
versely, James Madison proposed creating a Council of Revision,
comprised of the President "and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary.... with authority to examine every act of the National Leg-
islature before it shall operate. ' 59 Another proposal would have cre-
ated a council of federal judges which would have issued advisory
opinions on request from the President or Congress "upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."' 60 The framers rejected
54. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381.
55. The Incompatibility Clause states that "[n]o Senator or Representative shall, dur-
ing the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority
of the United States... and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
56. Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 41 (prepared statement of Judge Harris).
57. Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup.
Cr. REv. 123, 126 (1973).
58. Id. at 127.
59. Id. at 128-29 (omission in original). The proposal was "decisively rejected." Id.
60. Id. at 129.
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these proposals, and others on both sides of the debate at the Consti-
tutional Convention.
6 '
The impact of these actions is ambiguous, as the framers neither
banned nor mandated extrajudicial service. Thus, it is difficult to de-
rive any intent from these actions. Commentators have argued both
sides; some maintain that rejection of judicial councils set the tone for
a strict constitutional limitation that "judges should do-and only
do-what they are trained for;"62 while other scholars claim "that
even staunch opponents of judicial membership on the Council of Re-
vision thought that judges should perform some extrajudicial tasks. ' 63
In Mistretta, the Supreme Court addressed the question of the
historical basis for extrajudicial service. "We do not pretend to dis-
cern a clear intent on the part of the Framers with respect to this issue,
but glean from the Constitution and the events at the Convention sim-
ply an inference that the Framers did not intend to forbid judges to
hold extrajudicial positions."'64 Commentator Russell Wheeler framed
the historical inquiry: "It is at bottom a question of discretion
whether the judge can maintain judicial independence while serving
the nation off the bench. That discretion belongs in some degree to
those seeking the judges' services. But it belongs primarily to the
judges.
65
(1) Extrajudicial Service by Supreme Court Justices
Historically, judges have exercised this discretion by performing a
wide array of extrajudicial functions. Supreme Court Justices have
served extrajudicial roles from the time President Washington sent
Chief Justice Jay abroad to negotiate with foreign nations. 66 Similarly,
President Adams employed Justice Oliver Ellsworth to resolve dis-
agreements between the United States and France; Justice Harlan ar-
bitrated a Bering Sea controversy; Chief Justice Fuller and Justice
Brewer served on a tribunal arbitrating a boundary disagreement be-
61. See id. at 125-31 (discussing the various proposals for extrajudicial service).
62. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. CT.
R-v. 127, 177 (1967); see also Note, The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sen-
tencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1382-83 & nn.144-45 (1987).
63. Wheeler, supra note 57, at 129.
64. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 668 n.21.
65. Wheeler, supra note 57, at 131.
66. Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 L. CoNrEm,.
PROBS. 9, 25, 27-36 (1970). This article provides an extensive appendix entitled, Nonjudi-
cial Activities of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: A Selective Summary.
Id. at 27-36. McKay lists numerous examples similar to the proposed WTO Commission.
Id; see also Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1669 (listing additional examples); see gener-
ally Solomon Slonim, Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of the Separation of Powers,
49 CoNN. B.J. 391 (1975) (examining extensively the history and debate over extrajudicial
service and the separation of powers).
tween Venezuela and British Guiana in 1897; Chief Justice White arbi-
trated a boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica; Chief
Justice Hughes presided over a 1930 tribunal arbitrating the Guate-
mala-Honduras boundary dispute; Justice Van Devanter arbitrated a
controversy between the United States and Great Britain resulting
from the seizure of the "I'm Alone;" President Wilson assigned Justice
Joseph Lamar to a commission concerning relations between the
United States and Mexico in 1914; and Justice Owen Roberts served
on the fact-finding body that investigated the attack on Pearl Har-
bor.67 After World War II, Justice Jackson served as chief prosecutor
at the Nuremberg Trials.68 Perhaps most notably, Chief Justice Earl
Warren led the commission investigating President Kennedy's assassi-
nation.69 This abridged history of Supreme Court extrajudicial service
provides some guidance for an analysis of S. 1438. Most of the
Supreme Court Justices' extrajudicial roles involved discrete events
and had limited durations. In addition, the vast majority of tasks in-
volved international trade affairs, with the Warren Commission serv-
ing as a notable exception.
Consequently, these examples inform at least a broad analysis of
the separation of powers concerns underlying the WTO Commission.
67. McKay, supra note 66, at 27-36.
68. Id. at 34.
69. McKay, supra note 66, at 25. McKay criticizes both Jackson's and Warren's
decisions:
Justice Jackson's year-and-a-half absence from the Court when he was the princi-
pal prosecutor at Nuremberg was an embarrassment to the Court. Chief Justice
Warren's solution in connection with the investigation of the Kennedy assassina-
tion was scarcely better when he sought to perform two crucial tasks concur-
rently. That Warren succeeded as well as he did is a testimonial to his capacity,
not to the merit of the idea.
Id.
In explaining why he originally declined to serve, Chief Justice Warren stated:
I told [Deputy Attorney General] Katzenbach and [Solicitor General] Cox that I
had more than once expressed myself to that effect for several reasons. First, it is
not in the spirit of constitutional separation of powers to have a member of the
Supreme Court serve on a presidential commission; second, it would distract a
Justice from the work of the Court, which had a heavy docket; and, third, it was
impossible to foresee what litigation such a commission might spawn, with result-
ing disqualification of the Justice from sitting in such cases. I then told them that,
historically, the acceptance of diplomatic posts by Chief Justices Jay and Ells-
worth had not contributed to the welfare of the Court, that the service of five
Justices on the Hayes-Tilden Commission had demeaned it, that the appointment
of Justice Roberts as chairman to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster had served
no good purpose, and that the action of Justice Robert Jackson in leaving the
Court for a year to become chief prosecutor at Nuremberg after World War II
had resulted in divisiveness and internal bitterness on the Court.
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 356 (1977). The majority quotes this
passage in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 401 n.26.
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Most importantly, Supreme Court Justices have not balked at fulfilling
extrajudicial roles. This rather obvious observation weighs against a
strict separation of powers argument for the extrajudicial use of
judges. If Supreme Court Justices who were contemporaries of the
constitutional framers did not hesitate to accept extrajudicial assign-
ments from the executive or legislature, it is hard to justify a strict
latter-day prohibition on extrajudicial action.
However, the Supreme Court's experience is not entirely appo-
site. First, Supreme Court Justices serve a vastly different function
from Circuit Court appellate judges. The Supreme Court does not sit
year-round, as the courts of appeals do. In addition, Supreme Court
nominations have traditionally generated more political controversy
than seats on the lower courts.70 Although Supreme Court Justices
adjudicate cases, they also serve as tangible representatives of our fed-
eral judiciary.7 1 Thus, it seems less overreaching to involve Supreme
Court Justices in politicized international issues than it would to im-
pose similar functions upon appellate judges.
Procedurally, the WTO Commission is distinct because it would
not merely examine a unique, one-time event. Instead, it would be
more institutionalized, analyzing periodic decisions from the WTO
dispute settlement bodies. Even when commissions are assigned to
perform complicated and protracted tasks, like the Warren Commis-
sion's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, their pur-
pose has been confined to a single event. The conclusion of the
investigation ends the extrajudicial service. The, WTO Commission
would assume a more permanent and institutionalized role providing
judges with a different full-time job for five years.
(2) Extrajudicial Service by Lower Court Judges
Consequently, while the service of Supreme Court Justices pro-
vides a historical perspective, examination of lower court judges' ex-
trajudicial activities provides a more valuable and instructive
comparison. While usually limited to matters with lower profiles than
the Supreme Court's ventures, there has been no dearth of opportuni-
70. The controversy surrounding Justice Clarence Thomas' nomination is a notable
example of the attention paid to Supreme Court nominees. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The
Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthesis, 57 ALB. L. REv. 993, 993
(1994) ("The perennial controversy over the Supreme Court Appointment process reached
a new pitch of intensity during the Reagan-Bush era.").
71. Supreme Court Justices serve on numerous cultural commissions. See Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 400 n.24. By statute, the Chief Justice is a member of the Board of Regents of
the Smithsonian Institution and a trustee of the National Gallery of Art. Four Justices
have served as the judiciary member of the National Historical Publications and Records
Commission. In addition, Chief Justice Burger began serving as Chairman of the Commis-
sion on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution before he retired. I&
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ties, often at the request of Congress, for lower court judges to fulfill
extrajudicial roles.
Historically, federal circuit judges have executed a "substantial
number of tasks about which there appears to have been little contro-
versy. Congress assigned, and judges evidently willingly performed,
many duties in which they employed judicial skills in the service of the
executive and legislative branches. ' 72 While performed from the
bench, these tasks did not involve adjudicating legal cases. Many ex-
amples resemble the proposed Commission's duties. Examples in-
clude: a 1790 law allowing judges to receive applications from ships'
crews alleging their vessels were unsafe; a 1792 law directing federal
district judges to attend the salvaging of French ships shipwrecked or
stranded on the American coast; and a 1798 statute providing for an
investigation of contested congressional elections by lower court
judges, who were required to examine witnesses and forward findings
to Congress.
73
Two examples illustrate the historical parameters of the lower
courts' extrajudicial service. A 1790 law authorized the Treasury to
"remit fines or forfeitures paid by individuals guilty of unintentional
customs law violations. ' 74 Claimants filed their petitions with a dis-
trict judge who would investigate the facts of the violation in a "sum-
mary manner. ' 75 Although the Treasury Secretary examined the
results of the inquiry and decided if the fine should be remitted, the
court at least acted in a judicial manner. "The judge did not merely
state the evidence, but instead drew a 'legal conclusion' from the evi-
dence 'as to the existence of those facts.' 76 While the opinion was
neither binding nor the ultimate decision, the judges analyzed evi-
dence using a legally cognizable standard. Evidently, this format satis-
fied judicial concerns, because the judges duly executed the statute
and mounted no challenge to its validity.
77
The second statute, a 1795 law, gave judges the responsibility to
naturalize aliens. This provision required that "it shall further appear
to [the judge's] satisfaction that during that time [of a residency re-
quirement], he has behaved as a man of good moral character, at-
tached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and
well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same."78 This
law also went unchallenged by the judiciary.
79
72. Wheeler, supra note 57, at 132.
73. Id. at 132-33.
74. Id. at 133 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
76. Id. (quoting Justice Story) (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 132.
78. Id. at 134 (footnotes omitted) (insertion in original).
79. Id.
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While these laws seemed to straddle the division between tradi-
tional adjudicatory functions and extrajudicial advisory opinions, they
do provide insight into the legality of the proposed WTO Commis-
sion. As with the proposed Commission, lower federal judges have,
on occasion, examined evidence using established standards and re-
ported their findings to another branch. Apparently, this action did
not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Whether this would still be true today would depend largely on
how "court-like" the judge's actions appeared. The Supreme Court
recently held that congressional interference with judicial decisions
through retroactive reopening of final dispositions violates separation
of powers.8 0 This implies that executive or legislative review and re-
versal of a court's final opinion would tread upon judicial indepen-
dence. If, however, the previous judicial entities and the proposed
WTO Commission do not act as courts, there would be no constitu-
tional violation. Instead, they would sit as commissions whose mem-
bership is comprised of judges and review by another branch would
not tread upon judicial autonomy.8'
These examples, however, differ from the WTO Commission in
the same manner that traditional Supreme Court extrajudicial service
does; they all assumed discrete, limited tasks. Neither statute created
a new full-time task. Instead, they essentially conferred new, but lim-
ited jurisdiction upon federal judges. This is not equivalent to remov-
ing judges from the bench for a five-year period. Thus, the proposed
Commission is a much greater incursion on the judiciary.
More recently, lower court judges have served extrajudicially on
numerous commissions. For example, Judges A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., James B. Parsons, Luther W. Youngdahl, George C. Edwards, Jr.,
James M. Carter, and others have served on various presidential and
national commissions.8 Morrison's Special Division examined in
Morrison and Mistretta's U.S. Sentencing Commission are the latest
examples of extrajudicial service by lower court judges. The Supreme
Court overwhelmingly (7-1 and 8-1, respectively) approved these
activities.8
3
(3) Comparison with the NAFTA Dispute Resolution Proposal
Like the proposed WTO Commission, another controversial
trade agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), contains a dispute resolution mechanism utilizing federal
80. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1456-58 (1995).
81. This will be discussed in detail later. See infra Part III.B.2.
82. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 670 n.25.
83. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 654; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
judges.8 4 The proposed WTO Commission and NAFTA's dispute res-
olution procedures differ substantially. In addition, NAFTA's provi-
sions have yet to be applied, further decreasing their precedential
value.85 NAFTA's panels, however, do further illustrate the diverse
roles in which Congress has tried to employ the judiciary.
NAFTA establishes "binational panels" 86 to examine member
disputes and "extraordinary challenge committees" to review these
decisions. 87 The binational panel provisions favor judicial participa-
tion,88 and the extraordinary challenge committee mandates a panel
of five sitting or retired judges.89 These panels will function as
NAFTA's trial and appellate courts, resolving disputes between the
three member nations.90 While decisions are non-binding in domestic
courts, any member found to violate a decision could be penalized or
removed from the agreement.91
An elaborate selection process for the panels removes most con-
trol from the judiciary, placing selection responsibility with the United
States Trade Representative and the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee.92 However, the chief judges of the circuits are involved early in
the selection process and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as-
sists in assessing final eligibility of candidates. 93
The NAFTA agreement, like the WTO proposal, employs judges
outside of a strict Article III situation. Few other similarities exist.
The NAFTA panels mimic a court hierarchy, with lower and appellate
levels. Their decisions lack precedential value in U.S. courts, but may
be considered by the federal judiciary in its deliberations. 94 The
NAFTA panels (like the WTO's own dispute resolution body) can re-
view and overrule domestic international trade decisions, an action
the WTO Commission would be unable to take. The panels issue
written opinions, including concurrences and dissents. 95 In short, the
NAFTA panels function like transnational courts, unlike the WTO
Commission's strictly advisory role. While the two agreements pres-
ent some similar policy issues (the utilization of scarce judicial re-
84. NAFTA, supra note 15, at 687.
85. To date, the Chief Justice has approved no names for the list of candidates for any
NAFTA dispute resolution functions. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1672.
86. NAFTA, supra note 15, at 687.
87. Id. at 688.
88. See id. (stating that panels may also include international trade lawyers).
89. Id. at 687.
90. Id. at 688.
91. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
92. See Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1671. For a discussion of the importance of
judicial participation in the selection process, see infra Part III.A.
93. See NAIFTA, supra note 15, at 687-88.
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
95. NAFTA, supra note 15, at 687.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
July/August 1996] THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REVIEW COMMISSION 1649
sources and the use of federal judges to analyze international trade
matters), NAFFA's panels are too dissimilar to provide legal guidance
to analyze the WTO proposal.
96
However, the NAFrA dispute resolution panels do exemplify the
increased extrajudicial use of federal judges. As with the WTO, Con-
gress has selected federal judges to perform a nontraditional role. The
virulent reaction to the NAFTA provision may provide a caution for
proponents of the WTO Commission. Legal scholars have criticized
the NAFTA panels on both constitutional and prudential grounds.
97
Upon passage of S. 1438, constitutional analysts would almost cer-
tainly fix their aim on the S. 1438's Review Commission.
B. Legal Analysis of S. 1438 Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Professor Martin Redish has identified two separation of powers
dangers inherent in congressionally mandated extrajudicial duties.
First, as the "enforcer of counter-majoritarian constitutional norms
and as a check against the representative branches,"98 the judicial
branch must maintain its integrity and independence from the political
entities. Second, the unrepresentative judiciary must not encroach on
the authority of the democratically elected branches. 99 When judges
perform legislative, executive, or administrative tasks, their actions
evoke both concerns. As Redish notes, this danger is rarely evident in
any one judicial incursion.100 Instead, it arises from a subtle erosion in
judicial integrity, or conversely, an increase in authority.10 1 This con-
cern forms the basis for all separation of powers analysis of extrajudi-
cial activity.1°2
A court could assess the proposed WTO Commission using three
different analyses. A formalistic approach would invalidate almost
96. Interestingly, in August 1995, Senator Dole and other influential U.S. senators
criticized the dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA in a public letter which "called this
system 'fundamentally flawed' and expressed support for its elimination." John W. Head,
International Business and Kansas Lawyers: An Update on International Trade Rules and
How They Affect Kansas, 65 J. KAN. B. Ass'N 26, 30 (Jan. 1996).
97. See generally Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1673-77; Robert E. Burke &
Brian F. Walsh, NAFTA Binational Review: Should it be Continued, Eliminated or Sub-
stantially Changed?, 20 BROOK. J. IN'rL L. 529,562 (1995) (recommending the elimination
of panels).
98. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 12 (2d ed. 1990).
99. Id. The Supreme Court echoes this position in the test used in Mistretta, although




any incursion.10 3 This separationist model erects strict barriers be-
tween the judiciary and the political branches, condemning any judi-
cial action beyond live cases and controversies. Courts usually employ
this approach when Congress creates an agency exercising non-legisla-
tive powers and retains control over that agency. 10 4 Any court apply-
ing this theory would disapprove of the WTO Commission on an
essentially per se basis.
10 5
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Dean Jesse Choper has pro-
posed a "total deferential" model. 0 6 This "every branch for itself ap-
proach" assumes that "institutional capital" spent by the Supreme
Court on separation of powers issues will detract from the good-will
needed to protect minority rights.' 0 7 Although never adopted by any
court, this approach would likely result in blanket approval for the
WTO proposal.
Finally, the Supreme Court employed a "flexible"'1 8 functional
approach in both Morrison and Mistretta.10 9 This allows overlap
among the three branches, while placing limits on intermingling of
functions or powers. It is also described as the "checks-and-balances
understanding of the separation of powers."" 0 In Morrison and Mis-
tretta, Congress retained no power, and thus made no attempt to "ag-
grandize" itself at the expense of another branch.
Given the Supreme Court's recent actions as well as the factual
similarities between Morrison, Mistretta, and the WTO proposal, the
Court would likely apply a functional approach to assess S. 1438.
Although an act of Congress would create the proposed WTO Com-
mission, the bulk of the legislature's control would cease with enact-
103. The Supreme Court has traditionally applied this test when examining separation
of powers issues. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
974-76 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
104. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. In Bowsher, the Court employed a strict con-
stitutional analysis to invalidate congressional assignment of executive functions to a
Comptroller General; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974-76.
105. Professor Redish asserts that the "formal separationist" approach most effectively
serves separation of powers principles, and he would apply it to Morrison, Mistretta, and
almost certainly to the proposed WTO Commission as well. REDISH, supra note 98, at 20.
106. Id. at 14 (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLIT-
ICAL PROCESS 169 (1980)).
107. Id.
108. Id. Redish uses the word "flexible" to modify his description of the functional
approach.
109. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381.
110. Mark Nielsen, Comment, Mistretta v. United States and The Eroding Separation
of Powers, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1049, 1065 (1989) (internal quotations omitted);
see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 ("In adopting this flexible understanding of the separa-
tion of powers, we simply have recognized . . . that the greatest security against tyr-
anny.., lies not in the hermetic division between the Branches, but in a careful system of
checked and balanced power within each Branch.").
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ment. n ' The President is required to consult with members of both
houses, but has sole appointment power over the commissioners."
2
While the Commission would communicate with the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative (a presidential appointee)," 3 and potentially receive ad-ministrative assistance from executive bodies," 4 this would not seem
to "aggrandize" Congress at any other branch's expense. Although
the bill specifies no removal procedures, they would likely resemble
Mistretta's executive "for-cause" provision," 5 completely removing
congressional control. Finally, from a constitutional perspective, Con-
gress would gain no power from this proposal." 6 Consequently, in
assessing the constitutionality of S. 1438, the Court would likely em-
ploy a functional analysis.
One caveat to any constitutional analysis of the proposed Com-
mission is its apparent insulation from a court challenge. In Mistretta
and Morrison, individuals affected by either the Sentencing Commis-
sion or the Special Division had standing to sue.117 However, the
WTO Commission would create no substantive effects on any poten-
tial litigant, as it would merely advise Congress. No cause of action
seems to be available for any party against anyone involved with the
Commission." 8
While the Commission may be insulated from legal attack, this
certainly does not render a legal analysis moot. Any congressional
incursion on judicial autonomy should be subjected to stringent analy-
sis. As Professor Redish notes:
[T]he danger is an incremental one: eventually, the judicial branch
will either have acquired an excess of authority or will have lost
much of its requisite integrity, but to no single branch could be at-
tributed responsibility for the overall harm. But it is presumably for
that very reason that separation-of-powers protections are largely
prophylactic in nature: they are designed to prevent damage to the
111. The Court's decision to use a formal approach in Bowsher and Chadha rested on
congressional retention of control. See, eg., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27. Disturbingly,
despite the presence of partial congressional control over the independent counsel in Mor-
rison, the Court elected to apply a functional analysis. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693-95. Jus-
tice Scalia notes this inconsistency. Id. at 700-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. S. 1438 § 3(b)(1).
113. Id. § 5(b)(3)(A).
114. Id. § 5(c)(1).
115. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 409 (explaining that the President has the sole power to
remove judges from the Commission, and may only do so "for-cause").
116. However, Congress could gain a great deal politically from this proposal.
117. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370-71 (petitioner pled guilty in federal court and was
sentenced under the guidelines); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 667-69 (appellees indicted by in-
dependent counsel appointed by Special Division).
118. Hypothetically, one could file a suit against the Comptroller General to withhold
the paychecks of WTO Commissioners.
political framework before the truly serious harm intended to be
avoided can occur. 119
The important role of the separation of powers doctrine mandates
that any incursion into judicial autonomy, regardless of the magnitude
of the infringement or the justiciability of the action, creates constitu-
tional dangers. This Note now turns to these dangers.
C. Supreme Court Analysis of Extrajudicial Service: Hayburn to
Mistretta
(1) The Supreme Court's Test
Although the WTO Commission is a new and unique creation,
the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of extrajudicial
service in a number of cases. In Mistretta, the Supreme Court deline-
ated a two-part inquiry for analyzing judicial separation of powers is-
sues: (1) whether the task assigned to the judicial branch would be
more properly placed within a different branch; 20 and (2) whether
that task "impermissibly [threatens] the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch.' 121 The Court may not always address these ques-
tions explicitly, but the concerns consistently underlie the analysis.
(2) The Judge/Commissioners Distinction
When assessing extrajudicial activity, courts have distinguished
between tasks creating additional judicial functions and those which
compel judges to act as commissioners. While the parameters of this
distinction remain somewhat ill-defined, the Supreme Court has used
this distinction to uphold extrajudicial activity.
The Supreme Court first examined the issue in Hayburn's Case
122
in 1792, when it considered a request for a writ of mandamus ordering
a circuit court to execute a statute empowering courts to set pensions
for disabled Revolutionary War veterans. 123 Judges were utilized be-
cause Congress "wanted to make further use of the judges' honesty as
well as their ability as intelligent and capable fact-finders.' 24 Judges
on three circuit courts (including later Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Jay and later Justices Cushing from New York and Iredell from
119. RFDISH, supra note 98, at 12.
120. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679).
121. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)).
122. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
123. Id. at 409. Essentially, Congress requested that judges examine the wounds of
veterans and, based on their severity, determine the pension the veteran deserved. Judges
submitted their findings to the Secretary of War, who would allot that amount, unless he
suspected an error, in which case he could report the matter to Congress and "recommend
a reversal of the judge's recommendations." Wheeler, supra note 57, at 136.
124. Wheeler, supra note 57, at 136.
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North Carolina'25) concluded that the task could not be performed by
an Article III court.126
Although Congress changed the law before the Supreme Court
could decide the issue,127 the opinion noted in an extensive footnote
that three circuit courts had held that the statute infringed on separa-
tion of powers by assigning a non-judicial function to the judiciary.
28
The courts also held that Congress could not subject judicial decisions
to administrative review. 29 However, the New York district court
agreed to enforce the law in an ex officio capacity. 30 As Solomon
Slonim notes, "[T]he case appears to establish a distinction between
the exercise of nonjudicial powers by the court, as a body, or as an
institution, which is proscribed, and the exercise of such powers by an
individual judge, in his personal capacity, which is permitted.' 31
The Supreme Court addressed this issue again in United States v.
Ferreira,32 when it refused to hear appeals of district court decisions
on claims from a treaty with Spain.133 Instead, the 1819 statute pro-
vided for review by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Court con-
cluded that if the statute conferred the duties on the judges as
commissioners, "there seems to have been no doubt, at that time, but
that they might constitutionally exercise it, and the Secretary constitu-
tionally revise their decision."'1 34 Thus, the Court explicitly accepted
congressional delegation of powers to federal judges, so long as they
acted as commissioners, not as federal judges. As in Hayburn's Case,
the Court "found no difficulty, on the grounds of separation of pow-
ers, in the judge personally assuming a nonjudicial task."' 35
The crux of these decisions is the judge/commissioner distinction.
Although their basis is somewhat ambiguous, 36 the decisions hinge
not on the tasks assigned, but to whom they are assigned. In Mistretta,
Justice Blackmun concluded, "Ferreira, like Hayburn's Case, suggests
125. Slonim, supra note 66, at 405.
126. Id. at 404.
127. Id.
128. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. at 410, n.2.
129. Id.; see also Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1675.
130. Slonim, supra note 66, at 405. "The members of the Court for the district of New
York ... were of the opinion that the Act could indeed be interpreted 'as appointing
commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it, by official, instead of personal, descrip-
tions.' These judges were prepared to 'regard themselves as being the commissioners des-
ignated by the act."' Id
131. Id. at 404.
132. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851).
133. Id. at 52.
134. Id. at 50.
135. Slonim, supra note 66, at 407.
136. This was especially evident in Hayburn's Case where all the substantive law is
contained in the reporter's note. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 409.
that Congress may authorize a federal judge, in an individual capacity,
to perform an executive function without violating the separation of
powers."'1 37 Mistretta cites Hayburn and Ferreira extensively in up-
holding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission. In large
part, the Court bases its decision on the judges' nonjudicial commis-
sioner status.
1 38
The judges selected for the WTO Commission could fall within
the Hayburn/Ferreira commissioner designation. Although they
would retain judicial status, they would not be performing Article III
functions. As in Mistretta, the judges would serve, "not pursuant to
their status and authority as Article III judges, but solely because of
their appointment by the President as the Act directs."' 39 Their au-
thority "is not judicial power; it is administrative power derived from
the enabling legislation. ' 140 In short, proponents of S. 1438 would ar-
gue that Commission members may happen to be federal judges, but
they are serving as nonjudicial individuals.
While this argument facially mirrors that employed in the Court's
analysis of Mistretta, it is flawed on a number of facets. Conceding
that the Commissioners do not actually sit as federal judges on a
court, one can argue the panel resembles a federal tribunal so closely
that it could be considered quasi-judicial. Indeed, the Commission is
composed of five active circuit judges and is "designed to look re-
markably like [a] U.S. federal [court].' 141 No one would mistake a
Commission decision for a federal opinion. However, how is an ob-
server to effectively distinguish the five judges sitting as WTO Com-
missioners from an appellate panel? Why would Congress mold the
Commission to resemble a federal panel so closely, if it did not wish to
mimic a court structure?
The Court's analysis in Morrison would support the contention
that the WTO Commission is a court, not merely a commission of
individuals. Although the Special Division meets only to appoint spe-
cial prosecutors, Morrison held that the Division constituted a court
for purposes of the Article II Appointments Clause' 42 thereby en-
abling it to constitutionally appoint special prosecutors. As with the
WTO Commission, the Special Division is not a regular federal
137. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 403.
138. Id. at 404.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1676.
142. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 678-79. The Appointments Clause states in part, "Congress
may by Law, vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law .... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
The Court never explicitly questions whether the Special Division is a court for constitu-
tional purposes. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 669-70.
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panel.143 Instead, it is a congressionally created body comprised of
judges functioning administratively. While the Special Division has a
function vastly different from the WTO Commission, the structures
are essentially identical. S. 1438's proposal could arguably fit within
Morrison's implicit definition of a court.
Countering this classification would be disingenuous in light of
the repeated assertions made by Senator Dole and other proposal
supporters. Numerous proponents stressed that the Commission
needed the credibility provided by the federal judiciary.144 At the
Senate hearing, witnesses testified that this proposal was designed to
employ the prestige, credibility, and impartiality of the federal judici-
ary.145 Consequently, there is little room for a claim that the Commis-
sioners would be sitting as individuals and not as federal judges.
Thus, one could maintain that the proposed Commission is con-
stituted to resemble a court. Neither Mistretta nor its predecessors
provide guidance on what constitutes a court as opposed to a commis-
sion, or when judges sit as commissioners and not as judges. As Pro-
fessor Redish notes, "[lIt is difficult to imagine that the Article III
problem would disappear if the legislation were instead to create a
non-judicial commission whose membership happened to consist of all
of the judges of that Article III court.' 46 It is certainly arguable that
Congress has commissioned a federal appellate court to provide ad-
vice on WTO dispute resolution decisions.
If the Commission does resemble a court too closely it could pres-
ent separation of powers problems. Requiring an apparent federal
court to report to, and be reviewed by, Congress would impugn the
integrity of the judiciary. This would violate Mistretta's second fac-
tor. 47 Congressional supervision of a quasi-judicial panel might also
tread (at least at the margins) on the doctrine elucidated by Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farms-that Congress may not subject judicial decisions to
revision or review.' s Precedent originating with Hayburn's Case dic-
143. As described by the Morrison Court:
The court consists of three circuit court judges or justices appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States. One of the judges must be a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and no two of the
judges may be named to the Special Division from a particular court. The judges
are appointed for 2-year terms.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661.
144. See Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 2-4, 14,31 (including statements on neces-
sity of utilizing judges to establish Commission's credibility).
145. Id.
146. REDISH, supra note 98, at 19.
147. The second prong states "that no provision of law 'impermissibly threatens the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch."' Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)).
148. Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453.
tates that judges may only serve extrajudicially when they act as
commissioners.
As Justice Blackmun stated in Mistretta, "the Constitution, at
least as a per se matter, does not forbid judges to wear two hats; it
merely forbids them to wear both hats at the same time. ' 149 The
structure and format of the proposed WTO Commission could violate
this constitutional constraint.
(3) WTO Commission Infringement on Another Branch's Power
The WTO Commission may also run afoul of the separation of
powers constraints articulated in Morrison and Mistretta if it interferes
with another branch's functions. This would violate the first concern
posed by the Mistretta opinion.150
An initial, facial examination reveals little infringement. Com-
pared to Mistretta's Sentencing Commission, which infringes on legis-
lative rulemaking functions, the Commission has little effect on
Congress. Here, the WTO Commission acts in an adjudicatory man-
ner, albeit advisory. The Commission wields no legislative power and
does not infringe upon congressional duties. Effectively, the legisla-
ture has given nothing away. The Commission's "affirmative re-
ports"'151 do not force Congress to enact a joint resolution, nor does
Commission approval of WTO action preclude Congress from contra-
vening the treaty. 152 Invalidation of the Commission on this basis is
unlikely.
As for infringement on executive powers, the same general argu-
ment applies. Nothing in S. 1438 prevents the President or Trade
Representative from pressing his or her own views on WTO dispute
resolution decisions. While S. 1438 may place the judiciary in an unor-
thodox position,153 it is unlikely the Court would find it comes at the
expense of the executive branch. Commission decisions neither limit
nor compel administrative action. The evaluation of WTO decisions is
not a zero-sum game, where one branch's authority comes at the ex-
pense of another. Instead, Congress seems to be enlarging the uni-
verse of those who may examine the dispute resolution process.
154
149. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 404.
150. The first prong states "that the Judicial Branch neither be assigned nor allowed
'tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches."' Id. at 383 (quoting Mor-
rison, 487 U.S. at 680-81).
151. S. 1438 § 6(b)(1) & (2).
152. That the Supreme Court has rarely invalidated congressional delegation of its
power lends additional support for this argument. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73.
153. The Sentencing Commission does not suffer from the same predicament because
it addresses issues solely related to the judiciary. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395.
154. This is true at least in the constitutional sense, although it may not be true in the
more practical political sense.
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While a cursory analysis of the proposal does not reveal constitu-
tional infirmities, a closer look uncovers serious concerns. A criticism
of Morrison that is equally applicable here is that initially, Morrison's
two-pronged analysis ignores that Congress has instructed the judicial
branch to perform a non-judicial function 155 outside Article III's lit-
eral "cases and controversies" provision. Consequently, Congress
must have some constitutional basis to delegate this responsibility to
the judicial branch.
In prior cases, the Court identified constitutional authority for
congressional delegation in unusual situations. In Morrison, the Court
held that Article II's Appointments Clause provided a basis for the
federal judges in the Special Division to appoint special prosecutors
156
independent from Article III's constraints. 157 The Mistretta Court,
perhaps questionably, held that the "Necessary and Proper Clause"'
158
provided authority. 5 9 The Court stated, "[b]ecause of their close re-
lation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudicial
activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are not
more appropriate for another Branch."'
60
The same cannot be said of the duties assigned to judges on the
Commission. Unlike sentencing, international disputes are not part of
the judiciary's traditional jurisdiction. The Commission is a radically
different entity from either the Special Division or the Sentencing
Commission, and presents unique issues. Given the nature of the
WTO Commission, it is doubtful that a court could argue that review-
ing international trade decisions is a traditional role for lower court
judges acting either individually or as a panel.
In addition, no constitutional provision creates authority for Con-
gress to delegate review of international treaties. Certainly, the deci-
sions of an international tribunal are not "cases" or "controversies" as
the Court has interpreted them. Mistretta's "necessary and proper"
explanation would be equally inapplicable.' 6' Although an extensive
155. REDISH, supra note 98, at 17 (criticizing the Morrison analysis).
156. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
157. lId at 678-80.
158. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
159. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387-88. For a criticism of the use of this clause to sup-
port the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission, see Martin T. Tully, Comment,
The Supreme Court's Pragmatic and Flexible Approach to Federal Judicial Separation of
Powers Issues: Mistretta v. United States, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 405, 449 (1989).
160. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 389-90. The Mistretta opinion likened the promulgation of
sentencing guidelines to other judicially-administered functions. The Court has recognized
congressional power to create administrative entities such as the Judicial Conference and
the Administrative Office. Mistretta treats the Sentencing Commission as an extension of
this practice. Id. at 388-89.
161. A court could utilize Congress' power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. However, this argument fails for a myriad of
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examination is beyond the scope of this paper, no constitutional au-
thorization for this delegation is readily apparent. 162
Without textual authorization, any congressional grant of power
violates the separation of powers principle. To allow Congress to em-
power courts to act without specific constitutional authorization vio-
lates all but the most lenient separation of powers interpretation.
Even utilizing a "flexible" functional analysis,163 a court must impose
outer limits. Otherwise, constitutional overlaps would be so extensive
as to obliterate nearly all distinctions between the branches.
The counter argument is the initial, facial conclusion that the
Commission simply wields no power. This issue is ultimately a debate
over the definition of power as it fits within the issues enunciated in
Mistretta. If one believes the WTO Commission is powerless, it is
hard to oppose its function on separation of powers grounds; a power-
less judicial entity simply cannot infringe on another branch. Ulti-
mately, opponents of S. 1438 may have to concede this point. Aside
from the political pressure created by congressional rejection of Com-
mission decisions, the panel wields no real authority. Unless a court
found this political pressure created a substantial justification, it
would likely find that the Commission does not infringe on another
branch's powers.
Similarly, Commission proponents would claim that a powerless
extrajudicial entity could not infringe on the institutional integrity of
the judiciary. This argument is more difficult to sustain. Integrity can
be infringed in many different ways. These range from reducing re-
sources so that the judiciary cannot efficiently function to embroiling
the branch in political affairs. The Commission's perceived powerless-
ness would not preclude it from infringing on judicial integrity. Fur-
ther insight into this concern may be provided through an
examination of policy issues presented by S. 1438.
III. Policy Analysis of S. 1438
The policy implications of S. 1438 may violate the second concern
enunciated by the Court in Mistretta. If the Commission's tasks "im-
reasons, most prominently because the Commission, which reports directly to Congress, is
not an inferior tribunal.
162. To "check" its reasoning in Mistretta, the Court analyzed whether Congress could
have legitimately delegated the sentencing function to the executive branch without in-
fringing on the judiciary. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17. For a variety of reasons, the Court
decided this would have been improper. Id. Conversely, delegating non-binding review of
WTO dispute resolutions to an executive body, or certainly to a congressional sub-commit-
tee, would impose no harm upon the judicial branch. Id. ("If guidelines were to be
promulgated by an agency outside the judicial branch, it might be viewed as an encroach-
ment on a judicial function.").
163. See id. at 382.
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permissibly [threaten] the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch," the proposal will violate the separation of powers doc-
trine.164 Judicial integrity is vital to the effective administration of jus-
tice. The Court in Mistretta noted that "[tjhe legitimacy of the Judicial
Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and non-
partisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political
Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial
action."165
Although the Court has not explicitly defined an "impermissible"
violation of judicial integrity, it is possible to balance the policy impli-
cations created by this proposal. If Congress impermissibly appropri-
ates the judiciary's reputation for impartiality, places judges in an
ethical dilemma, or overburdens judicial resources, S. 1438 would vio-
late the separation of powers as enunciated by Mistretta.
A. Political Implications as a Threat to Judicial Integrity
(1) The British Experience with the Scott Commission
Great Britain's on-going experience with the Scott inquiry serves
as a cautionary example and illustrates potential political repercus-
sions of the WTO Commission. In 1993, British Prime Minister John
Major appointed Sir Richard Scott to head an inquiry examining
whether Cabinet ministers misled Parliament about the sale of mili-
tary equipment to Iraq.166 Major was "widely applauded" for ap-
pointing the "High Court judge known for independent thinking... to
shed light on Britain's version of the Iran-Contra scandal."' 167 At the
time, supporters viewed Major's appointment as a wise action to enlist
the aid of a respected member of the judiciary and insure an impartial,
in-depth examination of a potentially major scandal.168 Critics
averred that Major employed Sir Richard (as he is known) as a shield,
appropriating the integrity of the judiciary to gain political cover. 69
In either case, the investigation and subsequent report, which was
released on February 15, 1996, has set off a storm of controversy. De-
lays pushed back the original release date of July, 1995.170 An unau-
thorized leak of a preliminary draft, containing criticism of ministers
in Major's cabinet, touched off rancor within Parliament, including
164. See id. at 383.
165. Id. at 407.
166. Stephanie Strom, Arms for Iraq: PM Is Sullied by Dirty Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.




170. Andrew Grice & David Leppard, Damage Limitation, THE TIMns (London), June
11, 1995, at 14.
strident criticism of Judge Scott. 171 The delay led to additional specu-
lation about the report's timing, with political analysts speculating that
a November release date might encourage a challenge to Prime Minis-
ter Major's party leadership.
172
In the weeks leading up to the release of the report, the Judge
became further embroiled in politics. One former government official
attacked Judge Scott in an article in which he "accused Scott of being
engaged in a 'marathon contest with reality.""' 173 Finally, the report's
release prompted calls for resignations or firings of ministers impli-
cated in the scandal.
174
This imbroglio should give pause to proponents of the WTO
Commission. That this event made headlines in England, where the
judiciary does not have the strict American tradition of separation,
175
illustrates the drawbacks of judicial involvement in overtly political
matters. As with the proposed WTO Commission, the Scott inquiry
was merely charged with reporting its findings. Devoid of a legal basis
for the decision or the presumption of a court's impartiality, the re-
port was clearly attached to the political process. Consequently,
Judge Scott exposed himself to the type of criticism normally reserved
for the majoritarian elements of government. In addition, the delay
and eventual timing of the report embroiled the Judge in political
machinations usually avoided by the American judiciary.
In all likelihood, Americans would react similarly if Chief Justice
Rehnquist investigated the Whitewater or Iran-Contra affairs. While
the WTO Commission is not responsible for probing a governmental
scandal, the political ramifications of reporting to Congress on a con-
troversial issue of national concern could lead to similar criticism. In
addition to the constitutional concerns, one must question whether
Congress should subject the judiciary to the potential invective and
opprobrium attached to the Scott inquiry. A reaction like the one
which greeted the Scott Report would damage the integrity of the
judiciary.
171. Id. at 15 ("'The whole thing is an absolute farce-a music hall joke,' said one
senior Tory. 'Scott knows bugger-all about government. Governments in the rest of Eu-
rope must be laughing at us. We are the only country who would subject ourselves to
this."' One witness, Sir Richard Luce, said, "The Scott inquiry is unbuttressed by any ex-
perience of international affairs or parliamentary matters. This is not a personal comment
on Sir Richard Scott, it's about the nature of the inquiry. It's a fundamental mistake.").
172. Id. at 14.
173. Andrew Grice & David Leppard, Minister in the Firing Line, THE TIMES
(London), Feb. 4, 1996, at 14.
174. Inviting Defeat on Scott, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at 19.
175. See Wheeler, supra note 57, at 125-26.
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(2) Potential Political Repercussions of S. 1438
S. 1438's political implications present a distinct threat to judicial
integrity. S. 1438 involves federal judges in the thorny sovereignty dis-
pute surrounding the debate over international trade. This issue has
aroused tremendous passion from opponents of the WTO, who fear
U.S. laws will be preempted by foreign entities.176 Regardless of the
validity of these concerns, the WTO is an extremely hot issue.177 Judi-
cial review of WTO decisions would "involve the judiciary in debate
among the Congress, the President, and the public as to whether
membership in the WTO invades the sovereignty of the United
States... and that surely will not keep the judiciary above the fray of
political issues.' 78 A ruling either approving or rejecting a WTO de-
cision adverse to the United States would place the judiciary at the
center of the debate.
The process for selecting Commissioners also raises policy con-
cerns by excluding all judicial participation. Previous extrajudicial
commissions gave the judiciary substantial control. For example, the
President selects Sentencing Commissioners from a list of judges rec-
ommended by the Judicial Conference.17 9 Judges sitting on NAFTA
dispute resolution panels are also selected only after consultation with
the judiciary.180 However, the WTO proposal removes the judiciary
from this process entirely. It merely requires that the President con-
sult with certain members of Congress before appointing Commis-
sioners. 18' Without judicial involvement, "the President's selection
for the WTO review commission could be attacked as partisan or po-
litically-motivated, thus drawing the nominated judges into political
controversies."'u '
In addition, this process removes any locus of control from the
judicial branch. "The need for the judiciary to be involved in the as-
signment of its own judges is an inherent aspect of its independence.
James Madison wrote that 'neither of [the Branches] ought to possess
176. One commentator states, "[GATT] will limit state sovereignty by federal preemp-
tion of state laws enforced by mechanisms in the agreement that create a duty of signatory
nations to bring into compliance offending 'subfederal' laws. This will also oblige federal
courts to interpret and defend the treaty and the implementing federal legislation."
Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor In
Deep", 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 748 (1995).
177. See supra Part II.
178. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1675.
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1989).
180. See NAFTA, supra note 15, at 687.
181. S. 1438 § 3(b)(1).
182. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1675.
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directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the
administration of their respective powers.' '183
Finally, the aforementioned political controversy combined with
S. 1438's poorly defined standards of review may lead judges to make
politically influenced decisions. Even assuming complete neutrality
on the part of the Commissioners, it would be difficult to escape the
intense political ramifications of these international trade issues. This
is aggravated by the fact that judges receive little guidance from the
bill itself as to what guidelines the WTO dispute resolution panels
must follow. Even if the judges are able to avoid political pressure
and apply a reasoned analysis, all decisions will be subjected to in-
tense scrutiny and harsh criticism. Any suggestion of political influ-
ence would impugn the reputation of the judiciary.
(3) Presidential Control over the Commission
As discussed earlier, the executive would select the WTO Com-
missioners and likely have some form of removal power. Presidential
control elicits concerns about the judiciary's independence and integ-
rity. However, the Supreme Court appears to have settled the debate
over executive appointment and removal power.
In Mistretta, the Court held that the presidential powers of ap-
pointment and removal presented no greater danger of interference
than that which usually exists under judicial appointment proce-
dures.184 Without power to affect the salary or tenure of judges serv-
ing on the Sentencing Commission, the President lacks the "power to
coerce the judges in the exercise of their judicial duties."'1 85 The Court
conceded that removal from the Sentencing Commission could be
damaging to a judge's reputation, but countered that commissioners
voluntarily assume that risk when they agree to take the position on a
commission.186
The differences in the proposed WTO Commission could affect
the Supreme Court's analysis. The proposal provides no specific re-
moval provision. Anything less than the Sentencing Commission's
"for cause" standard would likely be rejected, as it could give the
President coercive influence over the Commissioners.
The absence of judicial input in the selection process could also
impact the proposal. Service on the WTO Commission could be con-
sidered less voluntary than similar work for the Sentencing Commis-
sion because of the absence of judicial input. The President could
183. Id. at 1673 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed. 1961)).
184. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 409-10.
185. Id. at 411.
186. Id. at 411 n.34.
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request a specific judge without any comment from the judiciary.
Although the judge could certainly refuse this request, a delicate or
uncomfortable political situation could be created. This would be es-
pecially true if the President had appointed the judge, or if they were
of the same political party. Even a slight increase in presidential influ-
ence over the judiciary would threaten the constitutionality of this
proposal.1a87
(4) Ethical Considerations of S. 1438
The proposed Commission may violate the Codes for Conduct
for Judges and Judicial Employees. 8 8 The Code could be interpreted
as barring this type of service.' 8 9 Canon Five states: "A judge should
regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with
judicial duties."'190 In Mistretta, the Court quotes subsection G:
A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental commit-
tee, commission or other position that is concerned with issues of
fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice, unless appointment of
a judge is required by Act of Congress. A judge should not, in any
event, accept such an appointment if the judge's governmental du-
ties would interfere with the performance of judicial duties or tend
to undermine the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the
judiciary.191
The commentary counsels caution in light of the "crowded dockets
and the need to protect the courts from involvement in extrajudicial
matters that may prove to be controversial."' 92
As the commentary notes, a code of conduct "ought not to com-
pel judges to refuse, without regard to the circumstances, tasks Con-
gress has seen fit to authorize as appropriate in the public interest."'193
Individual judges selected will have to exercise the discretion which
Wheeler discussed in determining whether their service would violate
the Code.194 In either case, S. 1438 compels judges to make a difficult
ethical decision.
187. See Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 41. Judge Harris highlighted this concern
in his appearance before the Senate Finance Committee.
188. 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, CODES FOR CONDUCT FOR
JUDGES AND JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES Canon 5 (1994) [hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
POLICIES].
189. Bloom & Restani, supra note 1, at 1676.
190. GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICIES, supra note 188, at Canon 5.
191. Id
192. Id. (commentary to the Canon).
193. Id
194. See supra Part III.A.
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B. Practical Implications of S. 1438
The WTO Commission will also hamper the judiciary's ability to
effectively administer justice. Judge Harris, in both a prepared state-
ment and testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, focused on
the practical concerns presented by the proposed WTO Commission.
Although in Mistretta the Supreme Court largely downplayed the Sen-
tencing Commission's effect on the judiciary, these concerns are legiti-
mate and weighty.
The Mistretta opinion equated the Sentencing Commission with
other administrative bodies like the Judicial Conference. 195 The
Court stressed the de minimis nature of this type of service. 196 How-
ever, the WTO Commission does not address issues traditionally
within the judiciary's purview, a vital factor in Mistretta.197 Moreover,
S. 1438 conscripts five additional members from the ranks of active
judges. As Professor Redish has noted, each factor viewed in isolation
may be de minimis, but over time the cumulative impact may become
weighty.19
8
Judge Harris delineated these practical concerns before the Sen-
ate Finance Committee. First, the federal judiciary is already short-
handed due to increasing dockets and existing judicial vacancies. 199
As Judge Harris stated, "The opposition of the conference is predi-
cated on the drain of scarce judicial resources that this feature of [S.
1438] would cause during this time of increasing judicial work-
load... [and] exacerbated by significant existing judicial vacancies on
the circuit courts of appeals .... -200 Removing federal judges at a
time when additional ones are desperately needed runs counter to
both concerns for judicial integrity and common sense.
This concern is supported when one examines the actual time de-
mands of the WTO Commission. The number of referrals each year
will depend on variable factors including number of complaints and
appeals filed with the WTO and number of adverse decisions.201 The
amount of time necessary to examine each referral is also unclear.
Judge Harris estimated each would take the full 120 days20 2 allowed
by the Dole Proposal. 20 3 Review would involve examination of a vo-
luminous record containing detailed trade and economic figures, pos-
195. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 406-07.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 389-90.
198. REDISH, supra note 98, at 12.
199. Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 41.
200. Id. at 40-42 (citing overcrowding figures).
201. See id at 41.
202. S. 1438 § 4(b)(1) (time limit for report by Commission).
203. Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 41.
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sible hearings, and a report-writing process.2o4 Judge Harris stated,
"If you get even two cases a year, I have trouble seeing how they
could do it within 120 days. '20 5
Judge Harris also expressed concern over the "plenary scope of
review" which the Commission would be forced to undertake. 206
Commissioners would not only have to examine the specific record,
but also be generally familiar with international trade practice and
procedure. Achieving a working familiarity would be a time-consum-
ing and cumbersome process. Finally, the "reporting requirement of
the bill" implies the presentation of a formal written opinion to Con-
gress, 207 another time-consuming exercise. These concerns led Judge
Harris to state "that it is therefore fair to conclude that Commission
membership would become a full-time job for a judge, or at the very
least, would require devotion of a substantial amount of time each
year., 20 8
Although S. 1438 would temporarily remove only five judges
from active service, it could affect the judiciary's ability to function.
Judge Harris expressed legitimate concerns about the Commission's
impact on efficient judicial functioning especially when viewed in light
of the other responsibilities Congress has placed on judges. Any ad-ministrative harm which the Commission would inflict on the judiciary
would infringe on the institutional integrity of the branch, and violate
the separation of powers doctrine.
Conclusion
The proposed "WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission"
implicates both constitutional and policy concerns. The long tradition
of extrajudicial service as well as the Court's support for recent extra-
judicial creations warrant a legal analysis of S. 1438. Even if a party
204. Id.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. As Judge Harris stated:
[I]t would appear that to conduct a meaningful 'complete review,' whether the
WTO acted 'arbitrarily and capriciously,' whether the WTO deviated from any
applicable international standards of review and caselaw, or whether its actions
affected the outcome of the dispute in a material way, Commission members
would have to develop expertise generally in the norms and construction of inter-
national treaty instruments, sources, and hierarchy of authority of international
law, and global economics principles and effects. The time it takes to develop a
thorough understanding of the general international trade law would be in addi-
tion to the time it takes for Commission members to master the underlying facts,
applicable treaties, and specific standards of review relevant to the matter
referred.
Id. at 41.
207. S. 1438 § 4(b)(2).
208. Hearings on S. 16, supra note 14, at 41.
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could contest the Commission in court (an unlikely prospect), the
Supreme Court would likely be hesitant to strike it down on constitu-
tional grounds. In discussing Morrison and Mistretta, Professor Red-
ish commented, "Invalidation of either could have given rise to
serious political repercussions. It is therefore not surprising-though
perhaps less than commendable-that the Court strained to find both
statutory schemes constitutionally legitimate. '209 It is likely that the
Court would do the same here.
However, the policy concerns presented by S. 1438 militate
against acceptance of the bill. The danger of enmeshing the judicial
branch in partisan politics is great. Great Britain's experience with
the Scott Report illustrates that:
Whenever issues that are highly visible and sensitive are entrusted
to a public commission for resolution or recommendation, the re-
sults are unlikely to satisfy all the critics, perhaps none. Participa-
tion in such a process by members of the judiciary is less likely to
settle a troublesome public issue than to lend credence to the charge
that the courts are part of the political process.210
Any judicial participation in the political process is unfortunate.
However, involvement in an issue as contentious as international
trade would be harmful to judicial integrity.
As for efficiency, S. 1438 comes at a time when judicial resources
are already strained. Congress and the Supreme Court have largely
ignored this issue. In Mistretta, Justice Blackmun wrote, "While in the
abstract a proliferation of commissions with congressionally mandated
judiciary participation might threaten judicial independence by ex-
hausting the resources of the Judicial Branch, that danger is far too
remote for consideration here."'211
The short-sightedness of this trend is alarming. The last ten years
have brought Morrison's Special Division, Mistretta's Sentencing
Commission, NAFTA's panels, and now Senator Dole's proposed
WTO Commission. These developments, each one further removed
from the traditional roles of the judiciary, increasingly infringe on the
federal bench. Straying from tradition, these commissions are not
designed to respond to extraordinary events such as the prosecution
of Nazi war criminals or the assassination of President Kennedy. In-
stead, they commit the judiciary to unprecedented roles.
The Supreme Court is undoubtedly correct; each new intrusion is
minimal and the actual effects on the courts nearly undetectable.
However, the combination of additional judicial burdens and in-
creased political involvement raise grave separation of power con-
209. REDISH, supra note 98, at 15.
210. McKay, supra note 66, at 25.
211. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407.
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cerns. The greatest danger comes from the congressional philosophy
that the judiciary is a resource to be tapped, like a vein of coal. How-
ever, like natural resources, the integrity of the judiciary will soon be
spent if it is not preserved.
In his dissent in Mistretta, Justice Scalia summarizes the argument
against measures like S. 1438 which impose extrajudicial duties:
"There are many desirable dispositions that do not accord with the
constitutional structure we live under. And in the long run the im-
provisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently per-
ceived utility will be disastrous.1 21
2
212. Id at 427 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

